

14 Discourses of Displacement: “Development,” Resource Conflict and Political Opportunism in Odisha

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Introduction

A substantial portion of population in Odisha, especially in the tribal majority districts, have been victims of displacement in some form or the other. The development initiatives, in its multiple forms like setting up of industries, building hydroelectric projects, mining of natural resources and establishment of SEZs, have been, arguably, a single important factor leading to displacement of large chunk of population from their native land. The rehabilitation policies of successive regimes haven't been able to address the issue effectively, leaving thousands of families live displaced and deprived of their rights and entitlements. The issue of displacement in Odisha can be gazed through multiple phases and perspectives. The first phase of displacement can be attributed to the development activities in and around the mineral resource-rich and tribal majority areas which made the marginalized communities victim of the development journey and vulnerable to exploitations. A sustained process of living in vulnerable situation and deprived of rights led to emergence of multiple conflicts (violent and other wise), mainly in the form of people's movements. The conflicts around the competition over limited accessible resources led to the second phase of displacement. A third phase of displacement can be linked to the state monopoly over the control over natural resources shrinking economic and employment opportunities for the local population. The large-scale displacement has had critical implications on the society and social interactions.

In order to understand the critical discourses of displacement in Odisha, this chapter is divided into four major sections. The first part investigates the development-induced displacement (DID) in Odisha, especially in the districts of undivided Koraput, Kalahandi and Sundergarh. The second section critically engages with the conflict-induced displacement in Koraput district. The third part explains the displacement issue as a resource which promotes political opportunism. The case of Vedanta mining and Utkal Alumina projects are critically engaged to explain this aspect. The fourth section of the chapter identifies the implications of long-standing displacement process on

social interaction. In this process, the chapter highlights the social identity and positions of the people who have been victims of displacement.

Development-Induced Displacement

The discourse around DID in India can be linked to the very understanding of development. Development, despite multiple definitional frameworks, seems to revolve around a general agreement that it encompasses continuous change in various societal aspects (Behera, 2017). However, this general agreement over the definition on development is mostly dominated by an aspect of “Western modernity” and has gained popularity. An alternative perspective to development as a process of structural and societal transformation is the achievement of short- to medium-term outcomes of desirable targets (Sumner and Tribe, 2008). In this sense, development is a process of economic growth and modernization. Another dominant understanding of development, off late, has been through the aspect of individual “freedom” narrative (Sen, 1999). By “development as freedom,” Sen pitches for enhancement of individual capabilities beyond a state-centric economic and infrastructural growth. Through the enhancement of individual capabilities, as Sen believes, majority of the contestations emerging from the issues of poverty, conflict, lack of governance and economic underdevelopment can be addressed.

Despite diversity of perspectives, the Indian state’s position on development, to a great extent, subscribes the one presented by Rostow in his seminal work *Stages of Economic Growth* (1960). The five basic stages of economic growth that Rostow suggests provide his version of attaining development in a society. Arguably, the Indian state’s endeavour towards development has been largely towards achieving economic growth and modernization in terms of building infrastructural establishments. Another critical aspect of India’s pursuit of development has been towards the process of nation-building. Economic growth, infrastructural establishment and nation-building process are the three important characteristics of Indian development model around which this chapter is based. Among several others, the development journey of India has contributed substantially towards the massive displacement of people from their native places. Otherwise economically poor state of Odisha has its fair share of displacement caused by development activities. The following section explains development-induced displacement in Odisha.

Development-Induced Displacement in Odisha

The initial development activities in Odisha, in a post-independence era, were in forms of establishment of large industries, building of hydroelectrical projects, extraction of products and mining to extract mineral resources. The mineral resource-rich districts of undivided Koraput, Kalahandi, Kendujhar, Sundargarh and undivided Cuttack (presently Jajpur) faced the brunt

of development activities. The tribal majority district of undivided Koraput witnessed heavy concentration of industries, as many as 20 big and small industries, in the first three decades of Indian independence. By the mid-1990s, undivided Koraput district had fully functional 18 large development projects which occupied 500,000 acres of land (7.42% of the total area of the district), which directly deprived 10% of the tribal population of their livelihood (Fernandes, 1991). The private contractors with active support from the state administration manufactured multiple narratives to woo the local people to give away their land for these development activities. An important narrative that was sold to the people to win their consent was their role in the nation-building process. Along with this, the local elites were used to promise the marginalized communities of better future through these development initiatives. While the better future for the marginalized communities is yet to come, they have been the worst victims of the displacement caused by the development project. The next section critically highlights four major development projects in undivided Koraput district and one in Sundergarh that contributed to massive displacement in Odisha.

An early development initiative in Odisha, in post-independence India, was the Machhkund Hydel power project constructed on the Duduma River. The idea conceived by the king of former Jeypore Estate in 1928, the work for the hydel power project started in the late 1940s. As a collaborative project between the states of Odisha and Andhra Pradesh, the major objective of the project was to generate hydroelectricity power. The luxury of *bijli* (availability of electricity) for the local population was the narrative around which the government officials, private contractors and the local elites functioned to convince the people to give their land for this development project. While the process of displacement began, the state authorities hardly had any plan or policy for proper compensation and rehabilitation for the displaced families. By the completion of Machhkund project, a total of 2,938 families were displaced. Among the displaced families, 1,500 (51%) belonged to Scheduled Tribes (ST) and 300 (10.21%) belonged to Scheduled Castes (SC) (Mahapatra, 1991). Out of the 2,938 families, only 600 were rehabilitated. As the grievances of the displaced people took a turn of agitations, the second phase of rehabilitation by the states' authorities was rather discriminatory in nature. The second phase of rehabilitation only accommodated the SC families leaving the tribal families to suffer (Behera, 2017).

Much like the Machhkund Hydel project, the Upper Kolab-Multipurpose power project was launched on the Kolab River in 1976. The main objective of this development initiative was to harness the water resources of Kolab River that would be used to irrigate around 50,000 hectares of land for agriculture purposes and to generate around 240 megawatts of electricity. One of the largest hydroelectricity projects, the Upper Kolab-Multipurpose project caused massive displacement. According to the available sources, 13,095 families (a total of 50,771) persons were introduced to the wrath of displacement from their native places. The displaced included 2,127

families (8,830 persons) belonging to the SC, 7,092 families (26,620 persons) belonging to the ST and 3,882 families (15,327 persons) belonging to the other castes (OC) (Stanely, 1996). In terms of rehabilitation, only 3,067 families (1,443 ST, 458 SC and 1,166 OC) were identified as beneficiaries, leaving around 10,000 families to remain displaced. The massive displacement caused by the Upper Kolab project has resulted in inducing many conflicts in this region. The conflict between the SC and OC is a good example. As families lost their land to the project purpose, the nature of social interactions in terms of gender relationship also affected to a great extent. Women, especially the tribal women, were confined to the household jobs as the forests and forest land were either taken over by the state or were submerged by the project reservoir.

A third major development project in Koraput district was the establishment of National Aluminium Company (NALCO) in 1981. A joint project between the Government of India and Government of Odisha, this industrial project aimed at mining bauxite and production of aluminium. Accordingly, two sites were demarcated: the Panchpatmali Hills with bauxite deposit for the mining purpose and Damanjodi area for the establishment of refinery and township. The NALCO project displaced 597 families (254 ST, 56 SC and 287 OC). Out of the total displaced, 441 families were rehabilitated in a colony set up in the Analbadi village. Apart from the official displacement, the NALCO also affected the lives and livelihood of 70 villages as it took control over 2,805.49 hectares of forest land which used to be a major source of sustenance for the villagers. In terms of compensation, the company only offered minimal jobs to limited displaced families (one member per family) which included 35 SC, 14 ST and 168 OC, out of which only 8 were women (Stanely, 1996). Along with causing displacement, the NALCO township also turned to a site of social division and discrimination. The township hosted the outsiders as the inhabitants and the local people (especially women) as domestic help in their own land.

Like the NALCO, the establishment of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in 1961 is another development project that caused massive displacement. The role of nation-building in the development thinking of the Indian state and the resultant expectations that the ordinary citizens should share their commitment came out clearly in the case of HAL in Sunabeda, Koraput (Behera, 2017). In the process of establishing HAL and a township, 21 villages consisting of 1,101 families were displaced. This time majority of the ST families, 763, had to bear the brunt of displacement. For many families, especially the tribal, this was the second displacement (Pradhan, 2007) as they were forced to settle down around Sunabeda after being displaced from the Upper Kolab area.

The establishment of Rourkela Steel Plant (RSP), Sundergarh, in 1959, unfolds an important chapter in India's development journey. In a collaboration with a private German company, Krupp Demag, the RSP was set up to increase India's steel production that would help India progress

in its development journey. The RSP, like many other development initiatives, can be seen through Nehru's vision as sites of modernity symbolizing secular nation-state and socialism. As the RSP was commissioned in 1959, it was estimated that the project would require 20,000 acres of land for the industrial complex and a modern township for the employees which would be acquired from the 13,000 people living in the villages around Rourkela (Sperling, 1963). According to a source, out of the 13,000 people, two thirds belonged to the ST (Ratha and Behera, 1990). By the completion of the project, as the available sources reveal, the RSP had acquired a total of 13,185.31 hectares of land and displaced 23,400 persons, out of which 11,300 constituting 48.29% belonged to ST (Mohammed, 2000). Against these numbers, the government source claims only 4,094 displaced persons (Ministry of Steel, 2019).

While the RSP caused massive displacement, the rehabilitation efforts by the state authorities have provided very little to the displaced persons. According to the government sources, only 6,486 displaced persons have been provided with some employment opportunities (Ministry of Steel, 2019). This number is a mismatch with the same source citing the number of displaced persons. At the same time, the local population and the displaced persons experience multiple forms of disposessions in terms of land alienation, displacement and discrimination (Strümpell, 2014). The issue of displacement in Odisha is not merely limited to the five development projects already discussed. There are other development projects such as the Hirakud Dam in Sundargarh, JK paper Mills in Rayagada and Indravati Dam that have also contributed to large-scale displacement in Odisha, especially in and around the tribal majority places. Larger implications of development-induced displacement on socio-economic and political lives of the people can be observed through these five major development projects in Odisha.

The process of displacement through development projects, to a great extent, dilutes the socio-economic and political rights of the people (Mishra, 2014). The development narrative, so far, has been state-centric which reduces the rights of the people to their responsibilities. As mentioned earlier, people are expected to be discharging their responsibilities towards the state's growth, modernization and nation-building process. In this exercise, the individual rights and entitlements have been compromised substantially as majority of the displaced persons have not been rehabilitated yet. Secondly, development-induced displacement has caused alienation in multiple forms. Land alienation among the marginalized communities is a major contribution of the displacement process. The marginalized communities, the ST and the SC have been the worst victims of loss of land to the development projects (Agnihotri, 2008). It is important to highlight that the benefits of compensation and rehabilitation has mostly gone to the big landowners (Sahukars) who otherwise owned large chunk of agricultural and other lands.

A second form of alienation is in the form of deprivation from the forest rights. The forest land taken for the development projects has never been

compensated to the local people as technically the forests are the state property. However, with the forests taken for the development projects, the local communities and forest product dependents lost their rights over forest and forest products which had adverse implications on their economy and social interactions.

Another critical form of alienation that the displaced people have been subjected to is the political apathy from the governance point of view and the resultant people's protest against the state activities. Studies have claimed that the tribal majority regions in Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, much of which come under the Fifth Schedule and are witnessing Maoist insurgency, have been victims of lack of governance (Behera, 2019). Moreover, the policy framework towards governing these areas hardly have been inclusive in terms of accommodating the "general will" of the marginalized communities. The process of exploitation, dispossession, deprivation and experiences of compound inequality, in terms of material deprivation and social stigma (Chandhoke, 2012), has also alienated people from the state. As people get alienated from the state, conflicts protesting state activities have been a permanent feature of these areas. The contribution of the development-induced displacement in leading to conflicts is very critical. The next section of the chapter highlights the conflict-induced displacement in Odisha.

Conflict-Induced Displacement in Odisha

The term "conflict-induced displacement" broadly describes situations in which people leave their native places to escape political violence (Lischer, 2009). The Indian state has been a home to multiple violent conflicts, which have also contributed to massive displacement. The ethnic conflicts in the North-eastern states (Hussain, 2000), the religious violence and displacement of the Hindu Pandits from Kashmir valley (Shekhawat, 2009) and the displacement caused by the Maoist insurgency in the Central and Eastern India are the major theatres of conflict-induced displacements. While the scholarly attention has been mostly on the violent conflict-induced displacement in India, the conflicts between the marginalized groups leading to displacements have not been adequately engaged with. In the case of Odisha, which also experiences the Maoist conflicts and related displacement, the issue of conflicts between marginalized groups and resultant displacement hasn't caught much attention in the existing literature. Stepping away from the dominant aspects of conflict-induced displacement, this section of the chapter explains two critical social conflicts and their implications on displacement.

Displacement of Dambas in Koraput

The displacement of the Dambas, an SC, from their villages in the Narayanpur Block of Koraput district hasn't caught much attention of the media

and the policymakers alike. Conflict between the Kandhas, an ST, and the Dambas led to the exodus of the latter from their villages to the district headquarters of Koraput. A little attention that this issue got in the local media links the entire event with the Maoist insurgency and holds Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangha (CMAS), an organization of peasants, labours and the tribals which is often linked to the Maoists. While conflict-induced displacement like that of the Damba displacement are often linked to some form of militancy or the other, there lies the deep-rooted issue of competition between the marginalized communities over the limited resources that they have access to. In the case of the Damba–Kandha conflict, the critical factor of distribution and ownership over land resources offers insights to understand the problem. Moreover, limited access to land resources for the marginalized communities can be linked to the very understanding of development narrative of the state. A conflict between two marginalized groups leading to the displacement of the Dambas is engaged through the issue of land relations and resource distribution.

The episodes of conflict and violence between the Dambas and Kandhas have been captured by a body of literature (Malik, 2020; Ambagudia, 2015; Padhi, Pradhan and Manjit, 2010). The available literature highlights three important dimensions of the conflict. They are the assertion of the tribal rights over land resources through the help of CMAS; the role of external factors such as the Maoists and outside leaders in accentuating and determining the result of the conflict; and the underlying history of alienation, exploitation and dispossession of both the Dambas and Kandhas. While these studies highlight some important aspects of the conflict, they overlook a critical issue of unequal distribution of the land resources (read competition among the marginalized communities to have ownership over scarce land resources), especially between the Dambas and Kandhas in Narayanpatna. Before we engage with the role of land resource distribution leading to conflict between these two communities, the next section highlights the nature of conflict. This is based on information shared to us during a field survey conducted by the author in Koraput, and in the affected villages in Narayanpatna Block.

The first set of narratives on the violent conflict comes from a relief camp at Koraput town of the displaced families. These families were displaced from Podapadar, one of the worst affected villages. According to the respondents, Podapadar village consisted of around 430 households. The distribution of the households remains like Komti: 4, Sundhi: 15, Damba: 200, Kosar (ST): 10 and the Kandha: 200 families. During the violent episode of 2009, 150 families belonging to the Dambas got displaced from the village. As the narrative goes, the Dambas are basically dependent on daily labour and a small section of the community run small/medium localized businesses. While it comes to landholding, it was shared that most Damaba families don't have major share. The same also goes for the Kandhas in the village. The 15 Sundhi and 4 Komti families have the largest landholding

in the village. The Dambas work as either agricultural labourers or in some cases as sharecroppers, majority of the Kandhas work as labourers for the Sundhis and the Komtis. As the hills and forests are under the control of the state, there have been instances of minor skirmishes between these two communities for a long time. In majority of cases, the conflict between these two groups have been on the issue of having control over land and other minor resources available in the village for sustenance.¹

The second set of narrative comes from the displaced families who are living at the Fire Station Relief Camp in Koraput town. These families originally belong to Tala Gumandi village which is around 25 kilometres from Narayanpatna Block office. The village consisted of 200 Kandha, 70 Damba, and 7 Mathia (fishing community) families. Like Podapadar village, here also the large chunk of landholding belongs to the Sundhis and Komtis of neighbouring villages. The 70 Damba families work as either sharecroppers or agricultural labourers for the Sundhis. As only five families in the entire village have landholding, majority of the Dambas have been dependent on small business, animal rearing, etc. While both the Kandhas and the Dambas control small landholdings, the village hardly witnessed any major conflicts between these two communities before December 2008 when the Dambas were forced to leave the village. These displaced families blame the role of CMAS in siding with the Kandhas and instigating them against anyone who didn't join them. The Dambas didn't join the activities of CMAS as they find the latter involved in illegal activities like land grabbing, snatching away livestock and beating people.²

The Kandhas, as shared by the displaced families, enjoyed the support of the CMAS and the Maoists. The CMAS using the slogans like "*jami amar, jungle amar, pani amar*" (land, jungle and water belong to us) garnered support from the Kandhas. The "innocent" and "simple" Kandhas, backed by the CMAS and the Maoists, grabbed around 3,000 acres of land in many villages in Narayanpatna Block and distributed among themselves under the supervision of the CMAS. The Dambas, as claimed by the respondents, were forced to leave their houses as they didn't take part in the "illegal" activities by the Kandhas, CMAS and Maoists. The displaced Dambas also highlighted the role of outside leaders, Gananath Patra, Prafulla Samantra, Srikant Mohanty and Dandapani Mohanty who supported the CMAS and the Maoists in all these activities.³

A contrarian narrative to the Dambas was shared by the Kandhas of Bhaliaput village, one of the epic centres of violence. Bhaliaput is predominantly a Kandha village consisting of 80 households. Of these, 79 families are the Kandhas and 1 family belongs to Damba community. Around 60 families in the village have small landholdings. The Kandhas in the village are mostly engaged with agricultural activities, labour, brick-making, etc. It is the village of the much talked about Kandha leader Linga Nachika. Bhaliaput with predominance of the Kandhas has been demographically different from the neighbouring villages of Tala Renga, Upar Renga, Podapadar,

Tala Gumandi, Dekapadu, Thingnaput, Jakapani, Salapguda and Upar Dekapadu.

The Kandhas in Bhaliaput have been subjected to multiple atrocities and the practice of *Gothi* (a form of bonded labour) for decades. As discussed earlier, majority of the families served as *Gothis*, including Linga Nachika (a Kandha leader) and his mother. A paradox as it might be, the numerically majority Kandhas have been subjected to exploitation by the minority Sundhis, Sahukars and the Komtis. Tikai Nachika, wife of Linga Nachika, who is also the present Panchayat Head of Podapadar, highlighted absence of consciousness among the tribal forced them to serve as *Gothis*.⁴ Under the leadership of Linga Nachika, the Kandha tribal came together to fight three major forms of exploitations; *Gothi*, liquor consumption and dispossession from land. *Jami Mukti, Mada Mukti and Gothi Mukti* (free from land alienation, free from liquor consumption and free from bonded labour) is a popular slogan as the Kandhas fight the exploitations and assert their rights. An organized struggle under the leadership of Linga Nachika, as shared by the villagers, was directed against the agents of exploitation, *Sundhi, Sahukar and Sarkar* (government). While the struggles have achieved the stated objective against *Gothi* and dispossession of land, freedom from liquor consumption remains a distant dream as the Sundhis in the neighbouring village still continue to make and sell liquor with “active” support from the government.⁵ The villagers also shared the atrocities that they had to go through in the process of struggle against the exploitation and their association with the CMAS.

As the organized struggle of the Kandhas reclaimed thousands of acres of land from the Sahukars (with [in]direct support from the CMAS), they are allegedly linked with the Maoists by the local administration, a narrative which was also readily bought by the state administration. In this connection, two of Kandha leaders, Kendruka Singana and Andru Nachika, were killed. Many villagers were arrested, including Linga Nachika and Birsu Wadeka, Samburu Sirka and Miha Hikaka. The villagers also shared their experiences of the Security Forces harassing the tribal women while most of their male counterparts were arrested.

In this narrative, the role of the Dambas does not really appear. However, the important issue of landholding continued to play a critical role in manifesting the latent conflict between these two groups. As the Kandhas “reclaimed” 3,000 acres of land in the villages mentioned earlier, the land was distributed among the Kandha households to cultivate. In this process, the big landlords in the neighbouring village lost their land to the Kandhas. But the landless Dambas who used to be dependent on these lands lost their job and felt alienated. Taking advantage of the vulnerabilities and grievances of the Dambas, the Sundhis and Sahukars mobilized them against the Kandhas. Perceived by a sense of empowerment with the support from the Sundhis and Sahukars and “backed” by the local administration, the Dambas, as shared by the villagers, attacked Bhaliaput on May 8, 2008.⁶

The main objective of the Dambas coming together against the Kandhas was twofold: firstly, to reclaim the land from the latter so that they can work and make a living, and secondly, guided by the Sundhis and Sahukars, they wanted to put an end to the tribal assertion which they perceive to have deprived them of land and other resources. As mentioned earlier, the struggle led by Linga Nachika had developed a sense of consciousness among the Kandhas as a result of which they retaliated the Dambas in violent manner forcing them to flee from their villages.

A fourth narrative to the conflict comes from the state. The state engages with the episodes of conflict between the Dambas and Kandhas within the larger issue of Maoist violence. In this process, the state links the CMAS with the Maoists (Behera, 2013) as one of its front organizations. Once the CMAS was linked to the Maoists, the state conveniently converted the social issue into security narratives and carried out measures to crack down on the Maoists and their “potential” members—in this case the Kandhas as they were supported by the CMAS. As a result, at least a thousand of the Kandhas surrendered before the district police (The Pioneer, 2013) in Koraput fearing strong measures from the state. The episodes of surrender by the Kandhas were projected as success stories of the state administration against crackdown on the Maoist movement. This process created a further division between the marginalized communities, Dambas and the Kandhas, as the former was seen closer to the state and the latter to the Maoists (Behera, 2016). This manufactured division only strengthened the conflict that has roots with distribution of land resources.

A fifth narrative on this conflict comes from the civil societies in Koraput district who have engaged with the process. The civil societies find the role of external forces in accentuating a localized conflict. The Damba–Kandha conflict, as shared by an advocate,⁷ has been there for ages. And such conflicts in any social setup are rather inevitable. He also highlighted the social cohesion between the tribal and the Dalits in undivided Koraput district that most academics and policymakers miss out to reflect upon. The external forces like the outsider non-tribal, the state officials and contractors and the Maoists have engineered differences among the deprived sections of the society to further their respective interests. The marginalized communities used to have localized indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms to minimize the risks of conflict. However, with the resources shrinking and outside forces involved, it manufactured competition among the marginalized communities. The manifestation of Damba–Kandha conflict in Narayanpatna can be seen through this narrative. The civil society organizations in Koraput hold the factors such as dispossession, exploitation and land alienation among the ST and the SC responsible for the manifestation of violent conflicts.

It is evident from the above discussion that the Damba–Kandha conflict which led to the displacement of hundreds of Dambas from their native places is not spontaneous in nature. Further, holding a violent movement by the Maoists doesn’t offer much to the problem. Taking a clue from the

above discussion, it can be safely argued that the conflict between two marginalized communities and resultant displacement of one community is a case of uneven distribution of natural resource, land, where the most marginalized community remain deprived as the numerically minority, but powerful groups have the monopoly over the resources. Scarcity of resources has been a critical factor leading to conflicts between groups in many forms and shades (Theisen, 2008). Similarly, competition and uneven distribution of resources also contribute to displacements. Landlessness or access to very limited landholding coupled with age-old exploitative practices have deprived the Kandhas from the resources which led to development of ethnic consciousness among them to fight. Similarly, the Dambas who have been sustaining as agricultural labourers working on the Sundhis' and the Sahukars' land felt alienated as the Kandhas claimed ownership over land. The perception of losing livelihood and ill-engineered provocation by the Sahukars and Sundhis prompted the Dambas pick up fight against the Kandhas. As the Kandhas outnumbered the Dambas, the latter had to face the worst case of displacement from their native places.

Displacement: A Political Resource

The issue of displacement also generates political resources which help certain groups furthering their political interests. Like the conflicts create resources and opportunism, displacement, whether a result of development or a conflict, also generates scope and opportunities. The organized movements protesting displacement and demanding fair treatment and justice, especially the ones that are guided and led by the outsiders, often use displacement as a tool to further their political interests. Involvement of political parties showing solidarity with a movement or the other against certain policies of the government is a good example. In Odisha, the involvement of Indian National Congress supporting the Niyamgiri Suraksha Samiti (NSS) against the mining proposal by Vedanta can be seen through this narrative. The movements like Green Kalahandi which lasted for a short period used the issue of displacement of 22 villages for the Vedanta refinery in Lanjigarh without influencing anything in favour of the displaced families. The similar thing can be said about the displaced families in Koraput. While the government policies have been indifferent towards the difficulties faced by the displaced persons, displacement as an issue continue to offer political opportunities.

Conclusion

As mentioned earlier, the development narrative has been dominant in understanding the discourse of displacement. An engagement through a development narrative offers limited perspective around displacement. Similarly, while the violent conflicts have contributed substantially to the

massive displacement of people, the deep-rooted social conflicts have also led to displacements. Additionally, social hierarchy, uneven distribution of resources and socio-economic inequalities are contributory factors of displacement. In the case of Odisha, the establishment of large development projects is the single important factor leading to large-scale displacement. As the issues related to displacement continue to remain unaddressed, they have led to inducing conflicts. The issue of displacement also highlights the deprivation of people in terms of their constitutionally guaranteed rights and entitlements. In the tribal majority areas, displacement can be directly linked to non-implementation of Forest Rights Act (FRA). As the tribal and other forest dependents are displaced from their native place, the whole purpose of the FRA is getting defeated. Such process also highlights the flaws in government's much talked of inclusive policies.

Notes

- 1 Interview with the displaced families from Podapadar village at Koraput SC/ST relief camp on January 5, 2019. Details of the interview are available with the author.
- 2 Interview with the displaced families from Tala Gumandi village at Fire Station Relief Camp, Koraput, on January 5, 2019. Details of the interview are available with the author.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Interview with Tikai Nachika at Bhaliaput, Narayanpatna, on January 6, 2019. Details of the interview are with the author.
- 5 Interview with villagers of Bhaliaput, Narayanpatna, on January 6, 2019. Details of the interview are available with the author.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Interview with Gupteswar Panigrahi, Lawyer in Koraput District Court, on January 3–4, 2019.

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